Contents
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- Part I: Representations and Basic Assumptions
- 2. The Extensive Form
- 3. Strategies and the Normal Form
- 4. Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
- 5. General Assumptions and Methodology
- Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings
- 6. Dominance and Best Response
- 7. Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
- 8. Location and Partnership
- 9. Nash Equilibrium
- 10. Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
- 11. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- 12. Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
- 13. Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings
- Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings
- 14. Details of the Extensive Form
- 15. Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
- 16. Topics in Industrial Organization
- 17. Parlor Games
- 18. Bargaining Problems
- 19. Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
- 20. Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
- 21. Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, and Ownership
- 22. Repeated Games and Reputation
- 23. Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill
- Part IV: Information
- 24. Random Events and Incomplete Information
- 25. Risk and Incentives in Contracting
- 26. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
- 27. Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
- 28. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- 29. Job-Market Signaling and Reputation
- Appendices
- A. Review of Mathematics
- B. The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibrium
- Index
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